Multi-Access Edge Computing --> ITS Roadway Equipment:
personal location information
This flow may also be implemented by
Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment --> ITS Roadway Equipment: personal location information Definitions
personal location information (Information Flow): Pedestrian, bicyclist, and other non-motorized user locations at an intersection as detected and reported by an RSE.
Multi-Access Edge Computing (Source Physical Object): 'Multi-Access Edge Computing' ((MEC) previously known as mobile edge computing) represents computing devices that operate and are managed like a cloud server, but are deployed at the edge of a network (typically a cellular network, but it could be any network). While not in strict proximity to the transportation network, these systems do benefit from vastly decreased distances to the roadway compared to central systems, and so can provide lower latency than strictly backoffice systems
ITS Roadway Equipment (Destination Physical Object): 'ITS Roadway Equipment' represents the ITS equipment that is distributed on and along the roadway that monitors and controls traffic and monitors and manages the roadway. This physical object includes traffic detectors, environmental sensors, traffic signals, highway advisory radios, dynamic message signs, CCTV cameras and video image processing systems, grade crossing warning systems, and ramp metering systems. Lane management systems and barrier systems that control access to transportation infrastructure such as roadways, bridges and tunnels are also included. This object also provides environmental monitoring including sensors that measure road conditions, surface weather, and vehicle emissions. Work zone systems including work zone surveillance, traffic control, driver warning, and work crew safety systems are also included.
Included In
This Triple is in the following Service Packages:
This triple is associated with the following Functional Objects:
This Triple is described by the following Functional View Data Flows:
- None
This Triple has the following triple relationships:
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Communication Solutions
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(None-Data) - Secure Wireless Internet (EU) (43)
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(None-Data) - Secure Wireless Internet (ITS) (43)
Selected Solution
(None-Data) - Secure Wireless Internet (EU)Solution Description
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ITS Application Entity
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Mgmt
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Facilities
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Security
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TransNet
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Access
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Note that some layers might have alternatives, in which case all of the gap icons associated with every alternative may be shown on the diagram, but the solution severity calculations (and resulting ordering of solutions) includes only the issues associated with the default (i.e., best, least severe) alternative.
Characteristics
| Characteristic | Value |
|---|---|
| Time Context | Recent |
| Spatial Context | Adjacent |
| Acknowledgement | False |
| Cardinality | Unicast |
| Initiator | Source |
| Authenticable | True |
| Encrypt | False |
| Interoperability | Description |
|---|---|
| Local | In cases where an interface is normally encapsulated by a single stakeholder, interoperability is still desirable, but the motive is vendor independence and the efficiencies and choices that an open standards-based interface provides. |
Security
| Information Flow Security | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality | Integrity | Availability | ||
| Rating | Moderate | Moderate | Low | |
| Basis | This is simply passing on received broadcast messages. It is intended to be received by everyone; however, all communications between field infrastructure should be protected from viewing to prevent attackers from analyzing traffic and developing attack methods. | We assume that this information is not able to cause the ITS RE to behave in extreme ways, e.g. to keep all the lights red forever because it thinks there's a baby in the middle of the road. In other words, the ITS RE has maximum durations for the different phases of the cycle which it will not go beyond not matter what this information flow contains. Bad information can cause annoyances and disrupt traffic flow to a limited extent but will not have a large impact. NYC: location should be accurate and should not be tampered; however, we assume the info is not able to cause the ITS RE to behave in extreme ways (i.e., there should be maximum different cycle phases) | If this is down, the ITS RE goes back to default behavior, which we assume is set sensibly. NYC: if down, the ITS RE should revert to default behavior which we assume is sensible | |
| Security Characteristics | Value |
|---|---|
| Authenticable | True |
| Encrypt | False |


