In order to participate in this service package, each physical object should meet or exceed the following security levels.
In order to participate in this service package, each information flow triple should meet or exceed the following security levels.
| Information Flow Security |
| Source |
Destination |
Information Flow |
Confidentiality |
Integrity |
Availability |
| Basis |
Basis |
Basis |
| Border Inspection System |
Traffic Management Center |
lane management inputs |
Low |
Moderate |
Low |
| There should be no sensitive information in this flow. Raise to MODERATE if reverse engineering of a proprietary interface is a concern. |
Since this information will be used to determine which types of vehicles are allowed in each lane, if it were intercepted and modified or corrupted, this could lead to decreased mobility and/or abuse of the lane management system. |
Should not require rapid response or frequent update. Raise to MODERATE if frequent real-time updates are part of the system scope. |
| Driver |
Vehicle |
driver input |
Moderate |
High |
High |
| Data included in this flow may include origin and destination information, which should be protected from other's viewing as it may compromise the driver's privacy. |
Commands from from the driver to the vehicle must be correct or the vehicle may behave in an unpredictable and possibly unsafe manner |
Commands must always be able to be given or the driver has no control. |
| Intermodal Terminal |
Traffic Management Center |
intermodal freight event information |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Moderate |
| While this likely does not contain any private or competitive data, it may contain a large bundle of freight movement information, that if observed by a hostile third party, would provide a snapshot that enabled that attacker to identify targets without needing to be physically present. |
Traffic management decisions are impacted by the quality of this data, so incorrect, unavailable or fraudulent data could have a significant financial impact. |
Traffic management decisions are impacted by the quality of this data, so incorrect, unavailable or fraudulent data could have a significant financial impact. |
| ITS Roadway Equipment |
Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment |
vehicle signage local data |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Moderate |
| This data is intentionally transmitted to everyone via a broadcast. It is meant to augment other signage data, and by definition is meant to be shared with everyone; however, all communications between field infrastructure should be protected from viewing to prevent attackers from analyzing traffic and developing attack methods. |
This information impacts the vehicle signage data sent to neighboring ASDs and should be trusted to avoid sending wrong information. DISC: WYO believes this to be HIGH. |
The system should know if these messages are not received. |
| ITS Roadway Equipment |
Driver |
driver information |
Not Applicable |
High |
Moderate |
| This data is sent to all drivers and is also directly observable, by design. |
This is the primary signal trusted by the driver to decide whether to go through the intersection and what speed to go through the intersection at; if it’s wrong, accidents could happen. |
If the lights are out you have to get a policeman to direct traffic – expensive and inefficient and may cause a cascading effect due to lack of coordination with other intersections. |
| ITS Roadway Equipment |
Multi-Access Edge Computing |
vehicle signage local data |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Moderate |
| This data is intentionally transmitted to everyone via a broadcast. It is meant to augment other signage data, and by definition is meant to be shared with everyone; however, all communications between field infrastructure should be protected from viewing to prevent attackers from analyzing traffic and developing attack methods. |
These signs are meant to augment other visual cues to the driver. They should be accurate, but any inaccuracies should be corrected for by other means. |
These notifications are helpful to a driver, but if the driver does not receive this notification immediately, there should still be other visual cues. |
| ITS Roadway Equipment |
Other ITS Roadway Equipment |
dynamic sign coordination |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Moderate |
| Any control flow has some confidentiality requirement, as observation of the flow may enable an attacker to analyze and learn how to assume control. MODERATE for most flows as the potential damage is likely contained, though anything that could have a significant safety impact may be assigned HIGH. |
Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. |
Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. |
| ITS Roadway Equipment |
Other ITS Roadway Equipment |
lane management coordination |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Moderate |
| Any control flow has some confidentiality requirement, as observation of the flow may enable an attacker to analyze and learn how to assume control. MODERATE for most flows as the potential damage is likely contained, though anything that could have a significant safety impact may be assigned HIGH. |
Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. |
Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. |
| ITS Roadway Equipment |
Other ITS Roadway Equipment |
shoulder management coordination |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Moderate |
| Any control flow has some confidentiality requirement, as observation of the flow may enable an attacker to analyze and learn how to assume control. MODERATE for most flows as the potential damage is likely contained, though anything that could have a significant safety impact may be assigned HIGH. |
Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. |
Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. |
| ITS Roadway Equipment |
Other ITS Roadway Equipment |
traffic detector coordination |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Low |
| Any control flow has some confidentiality requirement, as observation of the flow may enable an attacker to analyze and learn how to assume control. MODERATE for most flows as the potential damage is likely contained, though anything that could have a significant safety impact may be assigned HIGH. |
Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. |
Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. |
| ITS Roadway Equipment |
Other ITS Roadway Equipment |
video surveillance coordination |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Moderate |
| Any control flow has some confidentiality requirement, as observation of the flow may enable an attacker to analyze and learn how to assume control. MODERATE for most flows as the potential damage is likely contained, though anything that could have a significant safety impact may be assigned HIGH. |
Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. |
Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. |
| ITS Roadway Equipment |
Traffic Management Center |
lane management information |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Moderate |
| May contain PII, may contain source data describing device control and sensed status that if captured could be used in the commission of a crime or breaking of traffic laws or regulations. |
Information related to violations must be correct so that incorrect accusations are not made. Information related to device status and control must be correct to avoid wasted maintenance efforts. |
More or less important depending on the context. Could even be LOW if areas of minimal import, depending on local policies. |
| ITS Roadway Equipment |
Traffic Management Center |
roadway dynamic signage status |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Moderate |
| Device status information should not be available, as those with criminal intent may use this information toward their own ends. |
Data is intended to feed dissemination channels, either C-ITS messages or DMS or other channels, so it should generally be correct as it is distributed widely and any forgery or corrupted data will have widespread impact. |
Failure of this flow affects traveler information dissemination, the importance of which varies with the data contained in the flow and the scenario. Could be LOW in many instances. |
| ITS Roadway Equipment |
Traffic Management Center |
shoulder management information |
Moderate |
High |
Moderate |
| Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should be kept confidential to minimize attack vectors. While an individual installation may not be particularly impacted by a cyberattack of its sensor network, another installation might be severely impacted, and different installations are likely to use similar methods, so compromising one leads to compromising all. |
Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. |
Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. |
| ITS Roadway Equipment |
Traffic Management Center |
traffic detector data |
Low |
Moderate |
Moderate |
| No impact if someone sees the data |
Some minimal guarantee of data integrity is necessary for all C-ITS flows. THEA believes this to be LOW.only limited adverse effect if raw/processed traffic detector data is bad/compromised; DISC: WYO believes this to be HIGH |
Only limited adverse effect of info is not timely/readily available, however without this information it will be difficult to perform traffic management activities, thus MODERATE. If not used for management, may be LOW. |
| ITS Roadway Equipment |
Traffic Management Center |
traffic image meta data |
Low |
Moderate |
Moderate |
| Traffic image data is generally intended for public consumption, and in any event is already video captured in the public arena, so this must be LOW. |
While accuracy of this data is important for decision making purposes, applications should be able to cfunction without it. Thus MODERATE generally. |
While accuracy of this data is important for decision making purposes, applications should be able to function without it. Thus MODERATE generally. |
| ITS Roadway Equipment |
Traffic Management Center |
traffic images |
Low |
Moderate |
Low |
| Traffic image data is generally intended for public consumption, and in any event is already video captured in the public arena, so this must be LOW. |
Generally transportation coordination information should be correct between source and destination, or inappropriate actions may be taken. |
While useful, there is no signficant impact if this flow is not available. |
| Multi-Access Edge Computing |
ITS Roadway Equipment |
restricted lanes application status |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Low |
| This information could be of interest to a malicious individual who is attempting to determine the best way to accomplish a crime. As such it would be best to not make it easily accessible. |
If this is compromised, it could send unnecessary maintenance workers, or cause the appearance of excessive traffic violations, leading to further unnecessary investigation. |
A delay in reporting this may cause a delay in necessary maintenance, but (a) this is not time-critical and (b) there are other channels for reporting malfunctioning. Additionally, there is a message received notification, which means that RSE can ensure that all intersection safety issues are delivered. |
| Multi-Access Edge Computing |
Traffic Management Center |
restricted lanes application status |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Low |
| This information could be of interest to a malicious individual who is attempting to determine the best way to accomplish a crime. As such it would be best to not make it easily accessible. |
If this is compromised, it could send unnecessary maintenance workers, or cause the appearance of excessive traffic violations, leading to further unnecessary investigation. |
A delay in reporting this may cause a delay in necessary maintenance, but (a) this is not time-critical and (b) there are other channels for reporting malfunctioning. Additionally, there is a message received notification, which means that RSE can ensure that all intersection safety issues are delivered. |
| Multi-Access Edge Computing |
Traffic Management Center |
vehicle signage application status |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Low |
| This information could be of interest to a malicious individual who is attempting to determine the best way to accomplish a crime. As such it would be best to not make it easily accessible. DISC: WYO believes this to be LOW |
If this is compromised, it could send unnecessary maintenance workers, or cause the appearance of excessive traffic violations, or not properly communicate areas where maintenance workers are operating for example. Not HIGH because regardless of the application, this flow alone does not directly drive injury or damage. DISC: WYO believes this to be HIGH. |
A delay in reporting this may cause a delay in necessary maintenance, but (a) this is not time-critical and (b) there are other channels for reporting malfunctioning. Additionally, there is a message received notification, which means that RSE can ensure that all intersection safety issues are delivered. |
| Multi-Access Edge Computing |
Vehicle |
restricted lanes information |
Not Applicable |
Moderate |
Moderate |
| Broadcast and intended for public consumption. |
Should be correct or receiving vehicles may not take advantage of (if licensed) or violate (if not) limited access lanes. While there could be a safety impact, this is generally not the case. In areas with a noted significant safety impact due to illegitimate use of the limited access facility, this may be HIGH. |
Should be timely or receiving vehicles may not take advantage of (if licensed) or violate (if not) limited access lanes. While there could be a safety impact, this is generally not the case. |
| Multi-Access Edge Computing |
Vehicle |
vehicle signage data |
Low |
Moderate |
Moderate |
| This data is intentionally transmitted to everyone via a broadcast. It is meant to augment other signage data, and by definition is meant to be shared with everyone. |
These signs are meant to augment other visual cues to the driver. They should be accurate, but any inaccuracies should be corrected for by other means. |
These notifications are helpful to a driver, but if the driver does not receive this notification immediately, there should still be other visual cues. |
| Multimodal Crossing Equipment |
Traffic Management Center |
lane management inputs |
Low |
Moderate |
Low |
| There should be no sensitive information in this flow. Raise to MODERATE if reverse engineering of a proprietary interface is a concern. |
Since this information will be used to determine which types of vehicles are allowed in each lane, if it were intercepted and modified or corrupted, this could lead to decreased mobility and/or abuse of the lane management system. |
Should not require rapid response or frequent update. Raise to MODERATE if frequent real-time updates are part of the system scope. |
| Other ITS Roadway Equipment |
ITS Roadway Equipment |
dynamic sign coordination |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Moderate |
| Any control flow has some confidentiality requirement, as observation of the flow may enable an attacker to analyze and learn how to assume control. MODERATE for most flows as the potential damage is likely contained, though anything that could have a significant safety impact may be assigned HIGH. |
Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. |
Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. |
| Other ITS Roadway Equipment |
ITS Roadway Equipment |
lane management coordination |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Moderate |
| Any control flow has some confidentiality requirement, as observation of the flow may enable an attacker to analyze and learn how to assume control. MODERATE for most flows as the potential damage is likely contained, though anything that could have a significant safety impact may be assigned HIGH. |
Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. |
Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. |
| Other ITS Roadway Equipment |
ITS Roadway Equipment |
shoulder management coordination |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Moderate |
| Any control flow has some confidentiality requirement, as observation of the flow may enable an attacker to analyze and learn how to assume control. MODERATE for most flows as the potential damage is likely contained, though anything that could have a significant safety impact may be assigned HIGH. |
Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. |
Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. |
| Other ITS Roadway Equipment |
ITS Roadway Equipment |
traffic detector coordination |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Low |
| Any control flow has some confidentiality requirement, as observation of the flow may enable an attacker to analyze and learn how to assume control. MODERATE for most flows as the potential damage is likely contained, though anything that could have a significant safety impact may be assigned HIGH. |
Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. |
Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. |
| Other ITS Roadway Equipment |
ITS Roadway Equipment |
video surveillance coordination |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Moderate |
| Any control flow has some confidentiality requirement, as observation of the flow may enable an attacker to analyze and learn how to assume control. MODERATE for most flows as the potential damage is likely contained, though anything that could have a significant safety impact may be assigned HIGH. |
Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. |
Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. |
| Other Traffic Management Centers |
Traffic Management Center |
device control request |
Moderate |
High |
Moderate |
| Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should be kept confidential to minimize attack vectors. While an individual installation may not be particularly impacted by a cyberattack of its sensor network, another installation might be severely impacted, and different installations are likely to use similar methods, so compromising one leads to compromising all. |
Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. |
There should be multiple mechanisms for this information to arrive at the end recipient. If this is the only mechanism, should be raised to MODERATE. |
| Other Traffic Management Centers |
Traffic Management Center |
device data |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Low |
| Contains device identity, location and capabilities. If this information were available to a cybercriminal, it may make his task easier and compromise the systems involved. |
If this is corrupted, the other center will not properly understand the device capabilities and not properly leverage them, costing performance. |
Probably does not need to be updated often. |
| Other Traffic Management Centers |
Traffic Management Center |
device status |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Moderate |
| Device status information should be concealed, as an unauthorized observer could use this to reverse engineer device control systems. |
Device status information needs to be available and correct, or the controlling system may take inappropriate maintenance action, costing time and money. |
Device status information needs to be available and correct, or the controlling system may take inappropriate maintenance action, costing time and money. |
| Traffic Management Center |
Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment |
vehicle signage application info |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Moderate |
| Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should be kept confidential to minimize attack vectors. While an individual installation may not be particularly impacted by a cyberattack of its sensor network, another installation might be severely impacted, and different installations are likely to use similar methods, so compromising one leads to compromising all. |
If this is compromised, it could send unnecessary maintenance workers, or cause the appearance of excessive traffic violations, or not properly communicate areas where maintenance workers are operating for example. Not HIGH because regardless of the application, this flow alone does not directly drive injury or damage. DISC: WYO believes this to be HIGH. |
Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. This data should be received in a timely manner after it is sent. This will determine which lanes are blocked off for emergency vehicle use in incident management applications. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. |
| Traffic Management Center |
Enforcement Center |
lane violation notification |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Moderate |
| Contains PII and intended to be used for enforcement. Thus privacy implications that, while they may affect only a single individual at a time, could yield significant negative consequences to that individual. |
Contains PII and intended to be used for enforcement. Thus privacy implications that, while they may affect only a single individual at a time, could yield significant negative consequences to that individual. Must be correct to avoid false accusations. |
More or less important depending on the context. Could even be LOW if areas of minimal import, depending on local policies. |
| Traffic Management Center |
Enforcement Center |
request for enforcement |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Low |
| If this request were intercepted by a third party, that party may learn where enforcement assets would be and so could use that information to avoid such assets in the commission of a crime. |
Inaccurate or corrupted information here could lead to enforcement in areas not requested, and/or no enforcement in the area that was requested. Given that the request is possibly safety-based, this can negatively impact safety and/or mobility in that area. |
The setup of enforcement in a given area will likely be given and granted at low frequency; that is on the order of instances/week, not a real time request, so this flow does not need to be continuously available. |
| Traffic Management Center |
Intermodal Terminal |
intermodal freight traffic information |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Moderate |
| While this likely does not contain any private or competitive data, it may contain a large bundle of freight movement information, that if observed by a hostile third party, would provide a snapshot that enabled that attacker to identify targets without needing to be physically present. |
CVO decisions including job acceptance, routing and work planning are impacted by the quality of this data, so incorrect, unavailable or fraudulent data could have a significant financial impact. |
CVO decisions including job acceptance, routing and work planning are impacted by the quality of this data, so incorrect, unavailable or fraudulent data could have a significant financial impact. |
| Traffic Management Center |
ITS Roadway Equipment |
lane management control |
Moderate |
High |
Moderate |
| Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should be kept confidential to minimize attack vectors. While an individual installation may not be particularly impacted by a cyberattack of its sensor network, another installation might be severely impacted, and different installations are likely to use similar methods, so compromising one leads to compromising all. |
Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. |
Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. |
| Traffic Management Center |
ITS Roadway Equipment |
roadway dynamic signage data |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Moderate |
| Device control information should not be available, as those with criminal intent may use this information toward their own ends. |
Data is intended to feed dissemination channels, either C-ITS messages or DMS or other channels, so it should generally be correct as it is distributed widely and any forgery or corrupted data will have widespread impact. |
Occasional outages of this flow will delay dissemination of the data to travelers (the eventual end user) which could have significant impacts on travel, both safety and mobility impacts. |
| Traffic Management Center |
ITS Roadway Equipment |
shoulder management control |
Moderate |
High |
Moderate |
| Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should be kept confidential to minimize attack vectors. While an individual installation may not be particularly impacted by a cyberattack of its sensor network, another installation might be severely impacted, and different installations are likely to use similar methods, so compromising one leads to compromising all. |
Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. |
Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. |
| Traffic Management Center |
ITS Roadway Equipment |
traffic detector control |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Low |
| Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should be kept confidential to minimize attack vectors. While an individual installation may not be particularly impacted by a cyberattack of its sensor network, another installation might be severely impacted, and different installations are likely to use similar methods, so compromising one leads to compromising all. DISC: THEA, WYO believe this to be LOW: encrypted, authenticated, proprietary; but should not cause severe damage if seen |
Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH.. From THEA: should be accurate and not be tampered with; could enable outside control of traffic sensors but should not cause severe harm, but could cause issues with traffic sensor data received and be detrimental to operations |
Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH.. From THEA: want updates but delayed information will not be severe; should be able to operate from a previous/default control/config. DISC: WYO believes this to be MODERATE |
| Traffic Management Center |
ITS Roadway Equipment |
video surveillance control |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Moderate |
| Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should be kept confidential to minimize attack vectors. While an individual installation may not be particularly impacted by a cyberattack of its sensor network, another installation might be severely impacted, and different installations are likely to use similar methods, so compromising one leads to compromising all. |
Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. |
Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. |
| Traffic Management Center |
Multi-Access Edge Computing |
restricted lanes application info |
Low |
Moderate |
Moderate |
| Broadcast and intended for public consumtion. |
Should be correct or receiving vehicles may not take advantage of (if licensed) or violate (if not) limited access lanes. While there could be a safety impact, this is generally not the case. In areas with a noted significant safety impact due to illegitimate use of the limited access facility, this may be HIGH. |
Should be timely or receiving vehicles may not take advantage of (if licensed) or violate (if not) limited access lanes. While there could be a safety impact, this is generally not the case. |
| Traffic Management Center |
Multi-Access Edge Computing |
vehicle signage application info |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Moderate |
| Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should be kept confidential to minimize attack vectors. While an individual installation may not be particularly impacted by a cyberattack of its sensor network, another installation might be severely impacted, and different installations are likely to use similar methods, so compromising one leads to compromising all. |
If this is compromised, it could send unnecessary maintenance workers, or cause the appearance of excessive traffic violations, or not properly communicate areas where maintenance workers are operating for example. Not HIGH because regardless of the application, this flow alone does not directly drive injury or damage. DISC: WYO believes this to be HIGH. |
Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. This data should be received in a timely manner after it is sent. This will determine which lanes are blocked off for emergency vehicle use in incident management applications. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. |
| Traffic Management Center |
Other Traffic Management Centers |
device control request |
Moderate |
High |
Moderate |
| Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should be kept confidential to minimize attack vectors. While an individual installation may not be particularly impacted by a cyberattack of its sensor network, another installation might be severely impacted, and different installations are likely to use similar methods, so compromising one leads to compromising all. |
Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. |
There should be multiple mechanisms for this information to arrive at the end recipient. If this is the only mechanism, should be raised to MODERATE. |
| Traffic Management Center |
Other Traffic Management Centers |
device data |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Low |
| Contains device identity, location and capabilities. If this information were available to a cybercriminal, it may make his task easier and compromise the systems involved. |
info needs to be accurate and should not be tampered but should be able to cope with some bad data; includes inventory data which could lead to loss of assets if compromised |
data should be timely and readily available, but should not have limited consequences if not |
| Traffic Management Center |
Other Traffic Management Centers |
device status |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Low |
| Device status information should be concealed, as an unauthorized observer could use this to reverse engineer device control systems. |
info needs to be accurate and should not be tampered but should be able to cope with some bad data' could delay maintenance actions or waste resources checking devices that are actually in good status |
status infor should be timely and readily available, but should have very limited consequences if not |
| Traffic Management Center |
Traffic Operations Personnel |
traffic operator data |
Moderate |
Moderate |
Moderate |
| Backoffice operations flows should have minimal protection from casual viewing, as otherwise imposters could gain illicit control or information that should not be generally available. |
Information presented to backoffice system operators must be consistent or the operator may perform actions that are not appropriate to the real situation. |
The backoffice system operator should have access to system operation. If this interface is down then control is effectively lost, as without feedback from the system the operator has no way of knowing what is the correct action to take. |
| Traffic Operations Personnel |
Traffic Management Center |
traffic operator input |
Moderate |
High |
High |
| Backoffice operations flows should have minimal protection from casual viewing, as otherwise imposters could gain illicit control or information that should not be generally available. |
Backoffice operations flows should generally be correct and available as these are the primary interface between operators and system. |
Backoffice operations flows should generally be correct and available as these are the primary interface between operators and system. |
| Vehicle |
Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment |
vehicle location and motion |
Not Applicable |
High |
Moderate |
| This data is intentionally transmitted to everyone via a broadcast. Much of its information content can also be determined via other visual indicators |
Incorrect information could lead to the system not operating properly. If the system does not properly know where the vehicle is, it cannot make an accurate decision about whether there is going to be a pedestrian in the crosswalk that the vehicle is approaching. This can have a safety impact.; DISC: NYC believes this to be MODERATE |
This data is required for the system to operate properly. If this data is not available, the system cannot give accurate warning information. |
| Vehicle |
Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment |
vehicle profile |
Low |
High |
Moderate |
| Includes no PII and probably includes information that could be observed, so no need for obfuscation. |
As this information will be used to determine the vehicle's ability to access services or be charged usage fees, it must be correct and not easily forgeable. |
This flow enables various services; if the flow is not available the vehicle may not be able to use those services, and also may be charged incorrectly. |
| Vehicle |
Driver |
driver updates |
Not Applicable |
Moderate |
Moderate |
| This data is informing the driver about the safety of a nearby area. It should not contain anything sensitive, and does not matter if another person can observe it. |
This is the information that is presented to the driver. If they receive incorrect information, they may act in an unsafe manner. However, there are other indicators that would alert them to any hazards, such as an oncoming vehicle or crossing safety lights. |
If this information is not made available to the driver, then the system has not operated correctly. |
| Vehicle |
Multi-Access Edge Computing |
vehicle location and motion |
Not Applicable |
High |
Moderate |
| This data is intentionally transmitted to everyone via a broadcast. Much of its information content can also be determined via other visual indicators |
Incorrect information could lead to the system not operating properly. If the system does not properly know where the vehicle is, it cannot make an accurate decision about whether there is going to be a pedestrian in the crosswalk that the vehicle is approaching. This can have a safety impact. |
This data is required for the system to operate properly. If this data is not available, the system cannot give accurate warning information. |
| Vehicle |
Multi-Access Edge Computing |
vehicle profile |
Low |
High |
Moderate |
| Includes no PII and probably includes information that could be observed, so no need for obfuscation. |
As this information will be used to determine the vehicle's ability to access services or be charged usage fees, it must be correct and not easily forgeable. |
This flow enables various services; if the flow is not available the vehicle may not be able to use those services, and also may be charged incorrectly. |
| Vehicle Characteristics |
ITS Roadway Equipment |
vehicle characteristics |
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